Why not design future around 7 billion wonderful livelihoods

OUR HOPES & PRAYERS GO WITH PRESIDENT BIDEN AND QUEEN ELIZABETH BEING THE 2 MOST CURIOUS HUMANS EMPIRES HAVE EVER CREATED

diversity gamechangers in washington dc admin are rare- can raimondo be one? biden ai panel boldly goes where dc never has since v neumann

Tuesday, November 17, 1970

 


09:58
shows uh each of these power indices
10:02
um for the united states and china
10:06
uh it they pretty much speak for
10:08
themselves i won't take you through them
10:09
we don't have time
10:11
but you get the idea um but i would like
10:13
to draw
10:14
your attention to the two that are
10:16
lagging the other measures of power in
10:19
china
10:20
they are the power of the reserve
10:22
currency
10:23
and the power of the financial markets
10:25
in the financial sector
10:27
these powers traditionally lag other
10:30
powers
10:31
but in inevitably catch up in studying
10:34
history
10:35
i saw that all leading trading empires
10:38
over the last 500 years
10:40
had the world's reserve currency and the
10:42
world's financial centers
10:44
during the 1600s and the 1700s the dutch
10:48
gilder became the world's
10:50
um uh reserve currency and amsterdam
10:54
became the world's financial center
10:57
after
10:57
what we now call holland became the
10:59
world's largest trading country
11:02
in the 1700s and the 1800s the british
11:05
pound became the world's reserve
11:07
currency
11:08
and london became the world's financial
11:10
center
11:11
and after that was after the british
11:14
empire
11:14
became the world's largest trading
11:16
country and in the 20th century
11:19
up until now the united states dollar
11:22
uh became the world's reserve currency
11:24
and new york became the world's
11:26
financial center
11:27
after the us became the world's largest
11:30
trading country
11:32
china is now the world's largest trading
11:34
country
11:37
i believe china is now evolving into
11:40
that role uh even though china's
11:44
shares of world trade and world gdp are
11:48
comparable to the united states this
11:49
year
11:50
the remnb is less than two percent of
11:52
global reserves
11:53
world trade invoicing and cross-border
11:56
lending in contrast the us dollar
11:59
accounts for over 50 percent
12:01
of global reserves and trade invoicing
12:04
and is around 60 percent of cross-border
12:07
lending
12:08
i expect that to change as china moves
12:11
to internationalize their mmd
12:13
and open up its capital account capital
12:17
china's capital markets are opening up
12:19
to foreigners
12:21
and non-chinese investors who are
12:23
underweighted in them
12:25
for example though china accounts for
12:28
now
12:28
roughly 15 of world equity markets
12:31
capitalization
12:33
it counts only for a couple of percent
12:35
of global investors portfolios
12:38
so i believe that this is a very special
12:41
moment
12:41
because simultaneously there will be the
12:44
confluence of
12:45
the rapid development of the chinese
12:48
capital markets
12:50
the opening up of these markets to
12:52
foreign investors
12:53
the relative attractiveness of them and
12:56
the underweightedness
12:58
of global investors in them and this is
13:01
happening
13:01
when the fundamentals uh are undermining
13:05
the u.s dollars
13:07
i believe that these developments are
13:09
likely to lead to capital
13:10
and knowledge inflows into china and
13:14
that will benefit
13:15
the chinese capital markets and more
13:17
broadly benefit
13:18
foreign investors and chinese investors
13:21
too
13:22
because of how i see things
13:25
um and and the contact there i've been
13:28
a chronic bull on china uh people have
13:31
accused me of being biased
13:33
naive and in some cases unpatriotic
13:37
i think i'm just being objective maybe
13:40
i'm missing some important things
13:42
that this extremely well informed
13:44
audience can help me see
13:46
so i'm looking forward to our
13:48
conversation steve
13:50
uh that is a fabulous introduction and
13:53
basically a statement about why your
13:55
book is a must read because it really
13:56
goes into a lot of those
13:58
uh concepts in great in great detail so
14:02
it's fair to summarize to say that
14:04
you're looking at america
14:06
in relative decline versus china and
14:08
china
14:09
relative ascent is there something that
14:11
the united states
14:13
can or should do to kind of prevent that
14:17
relative decline
14:19
well it you know it all comes back to
14:22
those eight basics uh but
14:24
uh you know it's but let's put it into
14:28
basics
14:29
um you have all individuals
14:32
companies and governments at the end of
14:35
the day
14:36
have to earn more than they spend
14:40
and they have to have a solid balance
14:43
sheet
14:44
um of assets which are greater than
14:47
liabilities
14:49
um and it and you could see reverberate
14:52
through the economy with this shock
14:54
those who have those things are in good
14:56
shape and those who don't
14:58
uh are in bad shape that's true whether
15:00
or not you print your currency or not
15:02
so what that means is
15:06
you have to have um either
15:09
be able to be more productive because we
15:11
we're running deficits
15:12
in these regards and now we're funding
15:15
with that which we're printing
15:17
um or so you have to raise your incomes
15:20
or you have to cut your expenditures
15:23
we're lucky to have the exorbitant
15:25
privilege of the reserve currency which
15:28
allows us to do that
15:30
but we're testing the limits of that the
15:32
other things that
15:33
um successful empires have done over
15:36
there
15:37
is they have excellent broad in
15:39
education
15:40
and not education just in terms of
15:42
subject matter
15:43
but the teaching of civility of how
15:46
people should be with each other
15:48
and by and large they work in
15:51
ways that can be competitive and
15:53
inventive but they're
15:55
rowing in the same direction and they're
15:58
um as a result of that uh pursuing the
16:01
same missions
16:02
and they have a common dream you know we
16:04
called it the american dream
16:06
let's say if i think we need an american
16:10
dream
16:10
a dream of what what you know what are
16:13
we going after that we can agree
16:16
i thought it was equal opportunity i
16:18
would believe an equal opportunity might
16:20
be a good thing
16:20
but anyway you have to have a common
16:22
dream you have to have metrics
16:24
behind that common dream and uh then you
16:27
have to
16:28
um be pursuing it together those through
16:31
history have been
16:33
you know the most uh key elements of
16:36
countries
16:36
successes the
16:40
reserve currency question um you have
16:43
fifty percent of
16:44
reserves held in dollars two percent
16:48
held in renminbi
16:49
it's much more than global trade it's
16:52
confidence
16:53
in the currency since the renminbi
16:56
is not truly convertible how can
17:00
what's going to happen in the future
17:02
that's going to convince
17:03
those that are holding reserves to be
17:05
holding rmb
17:07
well um traditionally
17:11
um you could see that
17:14
uh there's the development of the r b by
17:16
the way i think it'll
17:17
evolve over decades but i think it'll
17:20
evolve pretty quickly
17:21
um they there is the loss of confidence
17:25
in the reserve currency which drives
17:28
people to see
17:29
alternative storeholds of wealth so uh
17:32
for example um when there's a debt
17:35
uh issue um there are two ways of
17:39
dealing with debt there there's hard
17:41
money you know you're traditionally
17:43
backed by gold
17:45
and when that happened um then
17:48
there was breakdowns in that monetary
17:51
system the valuation
17:52
so in for example uh classically
17:56
march 1933 roosevelt um
18:00
in with the debt problem uh was forced
18:03
to
18:04
go off the gold standard printed a lot
18:06
of money devalued the dollar
18:08
and then and then it moved on in 1971
18:13
we had the same nixon did the same thing
18:17
went off the gold standard um and
18:19
devalued and so on
18:21
and the creation of a lot of debt and
18:23
money
18:24
means that money goes someplace else and
18:26
it traditionally
18:28
both of those cases it went into stocks
18:30
gold
18:31
and other places so money is always the
18:34
holders of money
18:36
which are the holders of bonds bonds are
18:39
a promise to receive money a lot of
18:42
money over a period of time it's a very
18:45
long money position
18:47
and when those become unattractive such
18:50
as
18:51
now let's say you get zero interest rate
18:53
or close to zero interest rate or
18:55
even a negative interest rate and
18:57
there's a lot of creation of debt
18:59
and um a lot of printing of money that
19:02
drives
19:03
um that into other assets
19:07
they may not be another currency if
19:09
there's not a good currency
19:11
they may be stocks they may be gold and
19:13
they may be another currency
19:15
but it is that kind of time that we're
19:18
in
19:19
so next year and the year after no
19:21
matter what
19:22
we're going to have large deficits we
19:25
are going to produce a lot of debt
19:27
and we will monetize that debt and that
19:30
debt will have a negative real return
19:32
and therefore people will borrow in it
19:34
we'll find it more advantageous to
19:36
borrow in it
19:37
then own it and then they will move to
19:39
other
19:40
assets so that is one ingredient um
19:43
that's happening now at the same time as
19:46
another
19:47
number of ingredients the opening up of
19:49
the we need convertibility
19:51
don't we need convertibility no no you
19:54
don't need it capital flows you don't
19:56
need total convertibility
19:58
history you have confidence if you're
20:00
sitting in a central bank in japan or
20:02
the eu
20:03
or anywhere else if it's not ultimately
20:05
convertible you have an obligation to
20:07
your people
20:08
no the convertibility it depends on the
20:10
nature of the convertibility right
20:12
the capital account by the way is going
20:14
to be
20:15
opened you're going to you're seeing now
20:18
an
20:18
opening up of the capital account you
20:20
will see
20:21
and you also see more
20:24
internationalization
20:25
of the remnb but today i'm an investor
20:28
um in chinese capital markets um for the
20:32
last couple of years it's been
20:34
and i can safely bring my money
20:38
in and out and i have to in making those
20:41
decisions
20:42
decide what the relative risks are
20:45
of one type of risk versus another type
20:48
of risk
20:48
any country including the united states
20:52
can establish capital controls um
20:55
and there's a risk that countries china
20:58
does have capital control
21:00
one is theoretical one is actual but the
21:02
degree of capital controls
21:04
um as an investor who brings
21:06
international money
21:07
in and out of there some onshore
21:10
some uh linked because of the links that
21:14
they've created in hong kong for hong
21:16
kong markets and so on
21:17
i can get in various ways those types of
21:20
exposures both onshore
21:22
and offshore in a way that allows me to
21:25
put my money in
21:26
and take my money out i can do that um
21:30
so it's not an impediment as a
21:32
professional investor is doing this i
21:33
can guarantee you
21:34
it's not an impediment and so in making
21:37
those choices
21:37
now i recognize that at any time that
21:40
that could be
21:41
closed and you might have issues and so
21:44
on just like i
21:45
recognize you know it's it's a risk here
21:47
but one has to weigh those risks because
21:50
in re weighing those risk to be absent
21:54
the chinese capital markets is very
21:57
risky
21:58
uh because if you're looking at this
22:01
almost as being
22:02
think of it just as diversification um
22:05
there's the united states
22:06
and there's china and basically those
22:09
are the two big economies if you're
22:10
dealing with
22:11
mo industries of the future technology
22:14
and so on
22:15
um to be heavily weighted entirely
22:19
weighted almost
22:20
in the countries that are the older you
22:24
know
22:24
the reserve currency countries the
22:26
united states jur
22:27
um uh europe and japan and you look at
22:31
those
22:31
older more indebted countries that are
22:33
having problems
22:34
with monetary policy because they have
22:36
to produce a lot of debt and produce a
22:38
lot of money to do that
22:39
and then you and to not be in china is
22:42
to me in my opinion risky so i feel that
22:46
i have to have a diversification and i
22:48
compare those risks so none of the risks
22:51
are
22:52
zero it's just a matter of of assessing
22:55
that
22:55
and i can tell you yeah that market
22:58
that foreign investors are moving in and
23:01
the chinese are doing things to build
23:03
confidence
23:04
they can undermine it but i think that
23:06
the diversification
23:08
benefits are outweigh uh the risks
23:12
did the delay of the ant uh ipo
23:16
affect um that whole concept
23:20
no and um it's it's
23:23
it's such a good example that westerners
23:26
i think are like on their edges of the
23:28
seats
23:30
and they pay so much attention to the
23:32
one development
23:33
you know we're almost like news hungry
23:35
people what's today's
23:36
development and they don't pay attention
23:38
to the evolution
23:40
um i've uh had a lot of dealings with
23:43
uh chinese financial regulators and i
23:46
could say that
23:47
uh generally speaking no not generally
23:50
speaking almost always speaking
23:51
i found them to be reasonable caring
23:55
and highly informed people who are now
23:58
in an environment which is
24:00
um changing at an extremely fast pace
24:04
and that there's a risk of uh being
24:07
uh too loose or too tight particularly
24:10
on new types of
24:12
uh investment the ant is a whole new
24:15
concept innovative concept in terms of
24:18
banking
24:19
and almost could replace or threaten
24:22
or the banking system in china and it
24:24
hasn't
24:25
yet been properly established in terms
24:27
of regulatory
24:28
review and the like and so
24:31
that's an element and of course it's
24:34
important
24:35
to be clear that um what we have in
24:38
china
24:38
is state capitalism so state is going to
24:42
control those things
24:43
but i've watched in the united states in
24:46
terms of regulatory authorities struggle
24:48
to try to get the balance
24:49
between freedom of what is being done
24:52
and restrictions on what is being done
24:54
right
24:55
we had the financial crisis in the
24:57
united states
24:58
because they were too liberal in terms
25:00
of controlling some of the things that
25:01
were being done
25:02
there's always a wrestling match on that
25:04
and then
25:05
i think ant got ahead of that um it's up
25:08
to one
25:09
to interpret that but anyway it's the
25:10
regulatory authorities to decide that
25:13
and then so i think it was progressing
25:15
too fast and it had to be clear
25:17
as to who the authority was at one point
25:20
in my life i was an investment banker
25:22
who did ipos
25:23
if three days before an ipo
25:27
the deal was pulled wow that probably
25:29
would have been the end of my career at
25:31
that point that's quite a
25:33
you were not in good contact with the
25:35
regulators if that happened
25:36
um china is not
25:40
the same we can't um
25:45
judge china by the same exact standards
25:49
in the same ways
25:51
and i think that people could make the
25:54
mistake
25:56
of um mistaking
25:59
imperfections for
26:02
the changes in the directions
26:07
so as i'm saying if you look at the
26:10
directions
26:11
and you look at what's going on those
26:13
are the trends
26:14
and those are the forces about the big
26:16
things that i think that are going
26:18
going on i mean one could make a strong
26:21
argument that
26:22
that if you compare the language of the
26:24
third plenum of the 18th party congress
26:27
which was in 2013 to the
26:30
two weeks ago the fifth plenum of the
26:32
19th party congress
26:34
with respect to state participation in
26:37
the economy
26:38
it's really quite starkly different um
26:40
and a lot of the chinese miracle that
26:42
you have witnessed
26:43
in your 36 years and i've witnessed in
26:46
my
26:47
41 years in china is based upon the
26:50
private sector
26:52
and is the miracle going to continue
26:55
if the state is playing such a major
26:58
role
27:01
i think it's um it's important to
27:03
understand
27:04
to know the people and to understand the
27:06
intentions and then
27:08
interpret the actions in light of those
27:10
particular
27:11
intentions i think a lot of foreigners
27:16
may misunderstand that the very strong
27:20
reform policies that we've seen
27:23
pervasively at an extremely
27:25
fast pace are also happening at a time
27:29
when there's not going to be um total
27:32
or on um
27:36
unleashed state-owned enterprises
27:37
because there's certain benefits
27:39
so i see they're wrestling with
27:42
the question of what is what should be a
27:45
state-owned enterprise
27:47
and what shouldn't be a state-owned
27:48
enterprise is that a strategic
27:51
um enterprise should that be a problem
27:54
public private partnership should it
27:56
bring in equity
27:58
um or and so the desire to
28:01
um corporatize or privatize or whatever
28:06
a lot of state-owned enterprises and at
28:08
the same time
28:09
to keep them also many of them control
28:12
let's remember that this is a socialist
28:16
um capitalist economy and that when
28:20
matters of
28:20
employment are entered into their um
28:24
and direction everything is not a free
28:27
market
28:27
society um in the united states it's
28:31
almost entirely uh entirely a free
28:33
market
28:34
that has good and bad things sometimes
28:36
it's difficult to get resources
28:37
to where the resources should go
28:39
sometimes in education whatever
28:41
in building infrastructure building
28:43
roads is a challenge
28:44
in the united states there are pros and
28:46
cons but
28:47
in this um state capitalist type of
28:50
system
28:51
there will be those types of controls
28:54
and directions
28:55
i don't i think it would be a mistake to
28:58
say
28:58
um that um the
29:01
uh privatization let's call it of
29:04
state-owned enterprises
29:06
in china is not um happening
29:09
the way we capitalists would like
29:12
to mistake that to being that china
29:15
is not being is not producing uh
29:19
capitalist type of things like the
29:21
development of capital markets
29:23
um the increase in efficiencies i mean
29:26
we could just look at the results
29:28
you know we can look at how the covid
29:30
was handled how their economy is handled
29:32
and so thought if we're so hung up on
29:35
getting it exactly that way they
29:37
we might miss the bigger things that are
29:39
going on
29:41
you know i would argue that the returns
29:42
on state-owned capital versus private
29:45
capital are much much lower and
29:46
ultimately
29:48
they they will have to pay a price for
29:49
it but that's but that's
29:51
that's up to investors have the beauty
29:54
of being able to decide whether they
29:56
want to go into
29:58
or not want to go into those enterprises
30:01
but they're you you must agree that
30:04
there's a plethora
30:06
of uh wonderful companies
30:09
that this year will probably have
30:11
something like 40 percent of the ipos be
30:14
china
30:14
in the world big ipos um be chinese
30:18
companies
30:18
on chinese markets anyway a lot of them
30:21
will be chinese companies on chinese
30:23
markets
30:24
and we as investors have to decide
30:27
whether we want to go
30:28
to those companies in those markets or
30:30
not and so there's a lot
30:32
there to offer while you might stay
30:34
choose to stay
30:35
clear of the uh say don't enterprises if
30:37
you like
30:38
okay well let's go to our first um
30:40
audience question
30:41
from jasmine fan at blackrock
30:46
hello my name is jasmine fan from new
30:48
york and my
30:49
question is how do you think american
30:52
investment companies
30:53
should position themselves in the world
30:56
of u.s china decoupling
30:58
but also to consider opportunities in
31:00
the gradual opening
31:02
of china's financial market thank you
31:06
thank you for your question i think the
31:09
world is changing in very profound ways
31:12
and i think that um
31:16
sometimes when we look at it up close we
31:18
can mix the big pictures of change
31:22
and um that it is changing where
31:25
china is um really gaining its stride
31:30
um and anyway it will be a competitive
31:33
power so i think that investors
31:35
and um investment managers have a
31:38
responsibility
31:40
to um know china well be there
31:43
um and make investments there as they
31:46
must
31:46
i'm a global macro investor so i have to
31:49
be in all the major
31:50
markets and assess those and i think
31:52
that diversification
31:54
and being there and being aware so that
31:57
you have
31:58
um an intimacy of understanding of
32:01
what's going on in china
32:03
and make that those choices from that
32:06
intimate
32:06
up close perspective i think is required
32:10
if you're roughly at three percent now
32:12
and you're saying a neutral weighting
32:14
would be 15
32:15
how long do you think it'll take for
32:18
international investors to move to that
32:21
weighting
32:22
how many years by the way that 15
32:25
is also growing at a fast pace
32:28
so um i expect the 15
32:31
will grow and i expect that the
32:34
uh 15 percent so the 15 will grow in the
32:37
share of that will grow
32:39
um i would expect um i can't tell you
32:43
uh you know how fast but i would i would
32:47
say
32:48
maybe um you know something in the
32:51
vicinity
32:52
of a 30 to 50 percent uh
32:55
growth rate and not probably more annual
32:59
yeah yeah what is
33:03
central bank digital currency going to
33:04
play a role in this now that it's begun
33:07
to be
33:07
rolled out in in china
33:10
the um let me um explain digital
33:14
currencies for a second
33:16
um um globally there are two purposes
33:19
of an exchange rate and of a currency
33:23
and that is is a medium of exchange in a
33:25
store hold of wealth
33:27
um there so there's the digitalizing
33:30
of the clearing system um at
33:34
no central bank i believe is going to
33:37
allow
33:38
an alternative currency to gain strength
33:40
such as
33:41
a bitcoin type of currency and so on the
33:44
power of having
33:45
your own currency and being able to
33:47
print your own money is an enormous
33:49
power
33:50
and i don't think that you will see
33:51
anything like that but the
33:52
digitalization
33:53
is not only efficient from a transaction
33:57
point of view
33:58
it helps to um minimize
34:01
the risks of um the existing clearing
34:05
system
34:06
which is fairly heavily influenced by
34:08
the united states
34:10
some of our uh sanctions a lot of our
34:12
sanctions as you might understand
34:14
um which probably sanctions are our
34:18
greatest power the united states
34:19
greatest power
34:20
happen by um influencing through
34:24
sanctions
34:24
uh currency movements uh through the
34:27
swift clearing system and the like
34:29
uh digitalization um
34:32
helps to reduce those risks so that's
34:35
what's going on with
34:36
uh digitalization and i expect that
34:40
it will be um it'll be successful
34:43
even though ali and tencent already had
34:46
what was in effect digital
34:48
payment systems again is this was this a
34:50
question of the state
34:51
participating where the private sector
34:53
was already in it
34:55
this this is um the government
34:59
um uh the currency offering a
35:03
digitalized version of the currency
35:09
let's go to the next video question from
35:11
the next question from corey cooper
35:13
uh columbia law school black voices on
35:16
greater china
35:18
hello my name is corey cooper i'll be
35:21
attending the china town hall
35:23
keynote program with ray dalio online
35:26
my question has to do with the future of
35:29
u.s
35:30
china business relations general
35:32
secretary xi jinping recently gave
35:35
a foreign business friendly speech at
35:37
the third china international
35:39
import expo however given president
35:43
trump's propensity for blaming china
35:45
when questioned about the u.s economy
35:47
and the desire of some officials and his
35:50
administration to demonstrate their
35:52
quote
35:54
tough on china i wonder what your
35:56
thoughts are
35:57
on how likely it is that business
35:59
relations could actually deteriorate
36:01
rather than improve further between now
36:04
and january 20th when trump officially
36:07
leaves office
36:09
thank you
36:12
well um there's the question of the
36:14
conflicts and then there's the date
36:16
uh both are embedded in that question i
36:18
think um there are five types of
36:20
conflicts uh that exist with
36:23
the rising power challenging and
36:25
existing power um
36:27
they are and we call them wars there's a
36:30
trade war there's a technology war
36:32
there is a geopolitical war
36:36
um there is a capital war and then there
36:40
is a military let's call it competition
36:43
that you know could conceivably be into
36:45
a military war
36:46
uh they're all connected and they're um
36:49
and
36:50
because of the threats of those we um
36:53
are having uh decoupalization uh
36:57
taking place and and and which means the
36:59
building of
37:00
sort of self-sufficiency um and so that
37:04
is going to
37:05
be with us uh for a long time and how
37:07
those
37:08
conflicts are handled will uh matter a
37:11
lot
37:12
as far as the trump moves between now
37:14
and the
37:15
end of the year um regarding any actions
37:18
with china
37:19
i wouldn't expect my own guess is that
37:22
there wouldn't be
37:23
um any big developments uh that are
37:26
that that would be traumatic or
37:28
surprising
37:29
um in in either side but you know i'm
37:32
not
37:33
the geopolitical expert who should be
37:36
offering those uh comments as well as
37:39
other people here but by speaking to
37:42
many of those
37:43
i would say i wouldn't expect between
37:45
now
37:46
and january 20th a significant
37:50
uh developments in chinese uh
37:53
american relations pertaining to the
37:55
things you're asking about
37:57
yeah we have to hope not so there were
37:59
additional sanctions put on people in
38:01
hong kong
38:02
uh last night by secretary pompeo
38:06
um let's go you mentioned technology
38:09
let's go to a question on
38:10
technology from nick young in san
38:13
francisco
38:15
hi everyone this is nick young in san
38:17
francisco
38:19
as the u.s china tech war intensifies
38:22
both countries are pursuing separate
38:24
models of global cyber governance with
38:26
distinct values in ecosystems
38:29
china may have initiated this process
38:31
when it blocked facebook twitter and
38:32
google more than a decade ago
38:34
but now the united states has retaliated
38:37
by issuing
38:38
executive orders banning tick-tock and
38:40
wechat
38:41
with no positive turn in sight what
38:43
would a technology decoupling look like
38:45
and what would be the consequences
38:51
um the technology
38:55
decoupling um it's of course there's so
38:57
many technologies and so many um
39:01
applications but let's say at the big
39:02
picture level um
39:04
it certainly uh reduces the pace of
39:07
uh development um and
39:10
it um it puts um
39:14
entities uh who are trying to juggle
39:17
both
39:17
um you know sort of on edge um it
39:20
um um it means
39:24
my opinion it sets back development
39:27
particularly in the united
39:29
states in in some ways in china
39:32
um let's let's deal with that privacy
39:35
issue
39:36
um it is technologically a fact
39:40
that the more data you have um
39:43
and the the more uh artificial
39:46
intelligence is applied to that data
39:49
um the better you can understand and
39:53
uh manage things so uh from a
39:57
uh competitive point of view i think um
40:01
it's a desirable thing uh to have
40:04
the kind of uh massive collection of
40:08
data i've heard just just different
40:10
numbers eight times as much data per
40:12
person and so on and of course the other
40:14
side of that is the privacy side
40:16
um and well you know each person comes
40:19
down where they want what is the
40:21
uh benefit of of that privacy
40:24
in china um it's most people um
40:28
view that as something the that absence
40:31
of privacy is something that brings
40:32
about
40:33
uh the better security and a more civil
40:36
society
40:37
in the united states we value personal
40:40
uh privacy issues i'm not going to get
40:42
into that but from an efficiency point
40:45
of view
40:45
um it's you know contrary uh
40:49
to efficiency when those technologies
40:52
are decoupled
40:53
um and it also um
40:56
is somewhat of a disadvantage
40:58
technologically
41:00
um to have more uh holding of data
41:04
private than to um use it in a broader
41:07
way
41:10
raises the question of reciprocity
41:13
though
41:13
that facebook google youtube twitter
41:16
uh have been blocked in china for a
41:19
number of years now and
41:21
and wechat and tick tock and other
41:24
chinese
41:25
social media apps are able to operate in
41:28
the united states how do we resolve
41:30
that question in other words it's
41:33
there's a there's a sense and you've i
41:34
heard this a lot from the trump
41:36
administration
41:37
i'm i oppose the the wechat
41:40
and uh and tick-tock uh bans in the
41:43
united states however the response
41:45
from the trump administration is it's
41:47
not fair because we can't operate
41:49
similarly in china
41:51
um i think um i think everybody has to
41:54
look at what
41:56
the bigger picture what are the
41:59
most important things in each country
42:03
that won't be that'll be lines that
42:05
won't be able to be
42:06
compromised and there are different
42:08
things in different countries
42:11
um so you you're not going to get
42:16
equal approaches or
42:19
for example the privacy issue and google
42:22
and so on
42:23
um developing in china has to do with
42:27
how information is managed in china that
42:30
is managed in a way that's different
42:31
from
42:32
how it's managed in the united states
42:34
and so
42:35
reciprocity is not going to be something
42:39
that
42:39
you can develop policies on we're going
42:41
to have the same reciprocity you could
42:43
use them as
42:44
negotiating so you i think you have to
42:46
look at the you know what are the most
42:48
important things in you know china and
42:52
there's a certain government approach
42:54
that doesn't have
42:55
that same uh free flow of information
42:58
particularly foreigners however
42:59
we also there's a economic uh component
43:03
of it too
43:04
some countries are protectionists more
43:06
protectionists and more protectionists
43:08
in
43:08
some ways than other countries so those
43:11
are matters
43:12
of you know negotiation um but they
43:15
can't be
43:16
approached like um you know that
43:19
we can demand reciprocity with matters
43:21
that are not equal for example uh the
43:24
big issue
43:24
for the china for the biden
43:26
administration
43:28
is the human rights issue um
43:31
okay um that issue um is going to be
43:35
then dealt with with a sovereignty
43:37
question in china
43:38
china would view um a human rights
43:41
question
43:42
as a sovereignty question uh should
43:45
countries
43:46
uh operating um outside there outside
43:50
some of this jurisdiction
43:51
assess and judge and exert
43:54
pressure on how they should deal with
43:56
with domestic affairs
43:58
and so on so you have so how will that
44:01
work out
44:02
um there'll probably be a whole lot of
44:04
arguing about that
44:05
and then it'll come down to you know who
44:08
has what power
44:09
at the end of the day this whole thing's
44:11
going to come down to who has what power
44:14
and that's why i think we almost in the
44:16
united states
44:17
the important most important thing is
44:19
focusing on
44:21
how we can get stronger but anyway those
44:24
issues won't be resolved by um
44:27
expecting though we we do it and then
44:30
they'll do it too
44:31
see but the problem we have because
44:33
we're dealing you know
44:34
obviously i'm dealing with the congress
44:36
dealing hopefully with the new biden
44:38
administration
44:39
is when they're violations of what are
44:42
universal values this isn't a question
44:44
you know that it becomes extremely
44:46
difficult to persuade
44:48
the congress the american people that we
44:50
should even be
44:51
dealing with them on a lot of these
44:54
issues
44:55
so when you talk about reciprocity
44:57
people just go well
44:59
it's just not fair it's just not fair we
45:02
shouldn't be allowing that and the
45:04
argument the chinese make
45:06
with respect to facebook google youtube
45:09
twitter
45:09
actually doesn't hold water it it's
45:12
exactly what you said in the second
45:14
part it's protectionist it's economic
45:17
protectionism
45:18
it's not truly national security and if
45:20
china is not willing
45:22
to enter into discussions on these kinds
45:25
of issues
45:26
it's going to be really tough to get to
45:28
a constructive relationship
45:30
well um i think
45:35
the problem is that um different people
45:38
uh have different views about what is
45:41
fair
45:43
and in the reality of world affairs
45:46
is that those interpretations don't
45:49
matter
45:50
really much in international relations
45:53
maybe unfortunately but
45:55
maybe fortunately because if different
45:57
people have different views of what's
45:58
fair maybe you can't get
46:00
there and the only thing that really
46:02
matters are relative strengths
46:04
relative powers uh because it's a
46:06
negotiating
46:07
um thing and so um
46:12
you know it's very interesting um in the
46:14
history
46:16
uh the united states um really starting
46:19
under wilson
46:20
woodrow wilson was the first country
46:24
in history to view
46:27
that the relationships between countries
46:30
should be analogous to the relationships
46:34
that we want to have between people
46:36
within countries
46:37
in other words he viewed that the united
46:39
states as a democracy and that
46:42
um the way people should be with each
46:45
other
46:46
should be a model for world governance
46:48
and that's why
46:49
he formed uh the league of nations and
46:52
the league of nations failed and the
46:54
united nations failed and
46:56
after it so there's not a world
47:00
organization there's not a world court
47:02
to adjudicate
47:04
differences so for example when if you
47:07
say
47:07
that um you know the world uh wants um
47:11
um let's say that human rights issue and
47:14
so on
47:15
i would suppose if the world uh signed
47:17
an agreement
47:18
and agreed by and had enforceability
47:22
so that um they were that then you could
47:25
bring them to the
47:26
to the world court and resolve that um
47:29
and
47:29
uh let's say on the issue of wto uh
47:33
china brought issues of wto uh to the
47:36
wto
47:36
and um certain things were decided in
47:39
its favor certain things are decided
47:41
against it but the wto is
47:43
in not a governing institution and it
47:46
doesn't work
47:47
and neither does the united nations and
47:51
because power is where it comes down to
47:54
so americans have gotten used to
47:57
comfortably used to having their way and
48:00
deciding
48:01
that okay that's fair that's not fair
48:03
and so on be
48:04
as an extension of the power that we had
48:07
as a result of you know 1945 we created
48:10
a new world order
48:11