Why not design future around 7 billion wonderful livelihoods

feb 2022, wash dc-sadly idea of every 3 year old up merits a next door playschool seems to be taking inside beltway lawyers longer than landing on the moon - so women4empowerment have moved collab networks for 3 years up to Abedplay.com.. The debate on whether DC wants every American to be valued by Artificial Intel and hi-trust media ERevolution last chance at the metaverse continues below. May we also suggest EconomistDiary.com if you wish to tap into 4 hemisphere discussions of what the blip is happening to your young graduates era of 100 times more machine maths every decade (since 1951) when an economist sub-editor was briefed by Von Neumann on the biggest journalism scoop of all time and any sustainability generation
After the first year of Biden we can see that in spite of enough technology to save the human race, corralled by insanely lonely men like Mr Putin we are racing faster than ever towards extinction half way through the 15 year period that all nations had committed to the sustainability goals (ecop26 EUN). Why is this? - its a problem of media- which in turn is a wicked Keynesian problem of Governance, Societal and Environmental Markets (known the other way round by worlds biggest decision makers as ESG -see NYccAI.com for 15 annual spring briefings).
CRIMSON LIFESTYLES: Although Harvard has taken as late as 26 April 2022 to admit their debt to black americans is way north of 100 million dollars (imagine if they had admitted this before Biller Gates designed DOS). other far north friends and I can trace through my family ( diaspora scots, irish...) why the root cause of this [problem is that white institutions have not cared locally enough about the simplest human right : that of the next girl or boy born anywhere to have a fair chance of life.

My family has a lot of evidence on this ; in our case it can be classified around tHEse time periods: 2022 to 2000; TO 1984 TO 1976 TO 1962 TO 1945 TO 1936 TO 1758 - each of which we observed  FROM SOME QUITE DEEP GLOBAL VILLAGE DATUM

1962 back to 1951 back to 1945; 1951 was for my family the occasion of the greatest jopurnalist scoop ever; von neumann briefed my father on asking leaderes about what would they do with 100 times more tech every decade to 2020s (som,e now call this industrial revolution 3, 4; in silicon valley from 1965 they have also called its moore's law; my father's small role in future histoiry : he asked economist jouramlsits to appply this question for the next third of the century; this too the economist from 1951 3rd ranked weekly journal to one of a kindf gloabal viewspaper; The Economist had a weird history it was born in 1843 as a royal society chat sheet that got turned into queen visctora's attermpt to chnage english constitution from presiding over slave making empire to commonwealth); this has been the crisis embedded in tyhe english mindset since the beginning of engines scotalnds 1760s (some would say since the beginning of discovery on new worlds started in 1490s when the race started to own the most agressive navy)

2022 back to 2000 -business & social models of mobile digital age spun hatred and short-termsim opposite to sdgs; raised bodres between nations during the period all human communities needed to go borderless on human right goal 2000 back to 1984 (we lost the chnace to value the web as the an open learning network to shortt term commerce and nastier media)m/TD> 1984 back to 1976 ( by now my father was launching the new socio-economic genere of entrepreneuriual revolution with 15 yeras of evidence of cases on asia rising through a blend of supervillaige and supervity whose trades needed over time to be winw-in not zero sum; in fact if voin eneuman used the vocabularu IR3 - he would definme that as eera of applying 100 times more etch to way above zero sum games- THE OPPOSITE TO LEGISLATIRS UP TO 1945)1976 back to 1962 (we lost what presidents up to and particularly keennedy understood of the overarching challenge of uni8ted nations; at the same time the birth of the eu core purpose got lost by 1962) 1945 back to 1935: this corresponds to the uniques development period of my father from teenb home schooled in british embassies in moscow and horler's europ to spending his last days as teen allied boimber command burma to surviving woeld wars 2 being mentored by keynes, the economist's geoggery crwother and von neumann; in 1949 dad amrried the daughter of sir kenneth kemp who had written up teh legalese of india's independence;  1935 back to adam smith 1758  this explains why my my family tree was intersection of 4 generation osf scots in inda who had been nurses, pharmacists and social lawyers; and 4 generations of scots who had been missionaries, transnational dimplomats and whatever you call my father and myself ( i would say I am a (future histiry) of mathematician but with at best one hyndredth of the mind of the greatest maths nmetwo9rk that ever lived neumann , einstein et al. i desperately need help from every gps on the plant in recording why particularly whites have not yet designed goverance systems to value right of every next child born - but I belive its valid to ask:

what exactly was the conflict in 1945 between the 8 biggest empires - g8 twhite and japan; in addition what other conflicts were the g8 surrounded by all white developed nations- in essence engines from 1760 were applied by white men to rule over world trade; in effect less than 15% of the human race had designed almost all the world's wealth for themselves or the nations they lived in ; this was the root cause of world war 2 which the united nations needed to mediate over at most 4 generations - from those returning frow war through to today's younger half of teh wrold who will inherit systems which expoenetially lock them into extcinction unless the 2020s turmns thi round

OUR HOPES & PRAYERS GO WITH PRESIDENT BIDEN AND QUEEN ELIZABETH BEING THE 2 MOST CURIOUS HUMANS EMPIRES HAVE EVER CREATED

diversity gamechangers in washington dc admin are rare- can raimondo be one? biden ai panel boldly goes where dc never has since v neumann

Tuesday, November 17, 1970

 


09:58
shows uh each of these power indices
10:02
um for the united states and china
10:06
uh it they pretty much speak for
10:08
themselves i won't take you through them
10:09
we don't have time
10:11
but you get the idea um but i would like
10:13
to draw
10:14
your attention to the two that are
10:16
lagging the other measures of power in
10:19
china
10:20
they are the power of the reserve
10:22
currency
10:23
and the power of the financial markets
10:25
in the financial sector
10:27
these powers traditionally lag other
10:30
powers
10:31
but in inevitably catch up in studying
10:34
history
10:35
i saw that all leading trading empires
10:38
over the last 500 years
10:40
had the world's reserve currency and the
10:42
world's financial centers
10:44
during the 1600s and the 1700s the dutch
10:48
gilder became the world's
10:50
um uh reserve currency and amsterdam
10:54
became the world's financial center
10:57
after
10:57
what we now call holland became the
10:59
world's largest trading country
11:02
in the 1700s and the 1800s the british
11:05
pound became the world's reserve
11:07
currency
11:08
and london became the world's financial
11:10
center
11:11
and after that was after the british
11:14
empire
11:14
became the world's largest trading
11:16
country and in the 20th century
11:19
up until now the united states dollar
11:22
uh became the world's reserve currency
11:24
and new york became the world's
11:26
financial center
11:27
after the us became the world's largest
11:30
trading country
11:32
china is now the world's largest trading
11:34
country
11:37
i believe china is now evolving into
11:40
that role uh even though china's
11:44
shares of world trade and world gdp are
11:48
comparable to the united states this
11:49
year
11:50
the remnb is less than two percent of
11:52
global reserves
11:53
world trade invoicing and cross-border
11:56
lending in contrast the us dollar
11:59
accounts for over 50 percent
12:01
of global reserves and trade invoicing
12:04
and is around 60 percent of cross-border
12:07
lending
12:08
i expect that to change as china moves
12:11
to internationalize their mmd
12:13
and open up its capital account capital
12:17
china's capital markets are opening up
12:19
to foreigners
12:21
and non-chinese investors who are
12:23
underweighted in them
12:25
for example though china accounts for
12:28
now
12:28
roughly 15 of world equity markets
12:31
capitalization
12:33
it counts only for a couple of percent
12:35
of global investors portfolios
12:38
so i believe that this is a very special
12:41
moment
12:41
because simultaneously there will be the
12:44
confluence of
12:45
the rapid development of the chinese
12:48
capital markets
12:50
the opening up of these markets to
12:52
foreign investors
12:53
the relative attractiveness of them and
12:56
the underweightedness
12:58
of global investors in them and this is
13:01
happening
13:01
when the fundamentals uh are undermining
13:05
the u.s dollars
13:07
i believe that these developments are
13:09
likely to lead to capital
13:10
and knowledge inflows into china and
13:14
that will benefit
13:15
the chinese capital markets and more
13:17
broadly benefit
13:18
foreign investors and chinese investors
13:21
too
13:22
because of how i see things
13:25
um and and the contact there i've been
13:28
a chronic bull on china uh people have
13:31
accused me of being biased
13:33
naive and in some cases unpatriotic
13:37
i think i'm just being objective maybe
13:40
i'm missing some important things
13:42
that this extremely well informed
13:44
audience can help me see
13:46
so i'm looking forward to our
13:48
conversation steve
13:50
uh that is a fabulous introduction and
13:53
basically a statement about why your
13:55
book is a must read because it really
13:56
goes into a lot of those
13:58
uh concepts in great in great detail so
14:02
it's fair to summarize to say that
14:04
you're looking at america
14:06
in relative decline versus china and
14:08
china
14:09
relative ascent is there something that
14:11
the united states
14:13
can or should do to kind of prevent that
14:17
relative decline
14:19
well it you know it all comes back to
14:22
those eight basics uh but
14:24
uh you know it's but let's put it into
14:28
basics
14:29
um you have all individuals
14:32
companies and governments at the end of
14:35
the day
14:36
have to earn more than they spend
14:40
and they have to have a solid balance
14:43
sheet
14:44
um of assets which are greater than
14:47
liabilities
14:49
um and it and you could see reverberate
14:52
through the economy with this shock
14:54
those who have those things are in good
14:56
shape and those who don't
14:58
uh are in bad shape that's true whether
15:00
or not you print your currency or not
15:02
so what that means is
15:06
you have to have um either
15:09
be able to be more productive because we
15:11
we're running deficits
15:12
in these regards and now we're funding
15:15
with that which we're printing
15:17
um or so you have to raise your incomes
15:20
or you have to cut your expenditures
15:23
we're lucky to have the exorbitant
15:25
privilege of the reserve currency which
15:28
allows us to do that
15:30
but we're testing the limits of that the
15:32
other things that
15:33
um successful empires have done over
15:36
there
15:37
is they have excellent broad in
15:39
education
15:40
and not education just in terms of
15:42
subject matter
15:43
but the teaching of civility of how
15:46
people should be with each other
15:48
and by and large they work in
15:51
ways that can be competitive and
15:53
inventive but they're
15:55
rowing in the same direction and they're
15:58
um as a result of that uh pursuing the
16:01
same missions
16:02
and they have a common dream you know we
16:04
called it the american dream
16:06
let's say if i think we need an american
16:10
dream
16:10
a dream of what what you know what are
16:13
we going after that we can agree
16:16
i thought it was equal opportunity i
16:18
would believe an equal opportunity might
16:20
be a good thing
16:20
but anyway you have to have a common
16:22
dream you have to have metrics
16:24
behind that common dream and uh then you
16:27
have to
16:28
um be pursuing it together those through
16:31
history have been
16:33
you know the most uh key elements of
16:36
countries
16:36
successes the
16:40
reserve currency question um you have
16:43
fifty percent of
16:44
reserves held in dollars two percent
16:48
held in renminbi
16:49
it's much more than global trade it's
16:52
confidence
16:53
in the currency since the renminbi
16:56
is not truly convertible how can
17:00
what's going to happen in the future
17:02
that's going to convince
17:03
those that are holding reserves to be
17:05
holding rmb
17:07
well um traditionally
17:11
um you could see that
17:14
uh there's the development of the r b by
17:16
the way i think it'll
17:17
evolve over decades but i think it'll
17:20
evolve pretty quickly
17:21
um they there is the loss of confidence
17:25
in the reserve currency which drives
17:28
people to see
17:29
alternative storeholds of wealth so uh
17:32
for example um when there's a debt
17:35
uh issue um there are two ways of
17:39
dealing with debt there there's hard
17:41
money you know you're traditionally
17:43
backed by gold
17:45
and when that happened um then
17:48
there was breakdowns in that monetary
17:51
system the valuation
17:52
so in for example uh classically
17:56
march 1933 roosevelt um
18:00
in with the debt problem uh was forced
18:03
to
18:04
go off the gold standard printed a lot
18:06
of money devalued the dollar
18:08
and then and then it moved on in 1971
18:13
we had the same nixon did the same thing
18:17
went off the gold standard um and
18:19
devalued and so on
18:21
and the creation of a lot of debt and
18:23
money
18:24
means that money goes someplace else and
18:26
it traditionally
18:28
both of those cases it went into stocks
18:30
gold
18:31
and other places so money is always the
18:34
holders of money
18:36
which are the holders of bonds bonds are
18:39
a promise to receive money a lot of
18:42
money over a period of time it's a very
18:45
long money position
18:47
and when those become unattractive such
18:50
as
18:51
now let's say you get zero interest rate
18:53
or close to zero interest rate or
18:55
even a negative interest rate and
18:57
there's a lot of creation of debt
18:59
and um a lot of printing of money that
19:02
drives
19:03
um that into other assets
19:07
they may not be another currency if
19:09
there's not a good currency
19:11
they may be stocks they may be gold and
19:13
they may be another currency
19:15
but it is that kind of time that we're
19:18
in
19:19
so next year and the year after no
19:21
matter what
19:22
we're going to have large deficits we
19:25
are going to produce a lot of debt
19:27
and we will monetize that debt and that
19:30
debt will have a negative real return
19:32
and therefore people will borrow in it
19:34
we'll find it more advantageous to
19:36
borrow in it
19:37
then own it and then they will move to
19:39
other
19:40
assets so that is one ingredient um
19:43
that's happening now at the same time as
19:46
another
19:47
number of ingredients the opening up of
19:49
the we need convertibility
19:51
don't we need convertibility no no you
19:54
don't need it capital flows you don't
19:56
need total convertibility
19:58
history you have confidence if you're
20:00
sitting in a central bank in japan or
20:02
the eu
20:03
or anywhere else if it's not ultimately
20:05
convertible you have an obligation to
20:07
your people
20:08
no the convertibility it depends on the
20:10
nature of the convertibility right
20:12
the capital account by the way is going
20:14
to be
20:15
opened you're going to you're seeing now
20:18
an
20:18
opening up of the capital account you
20:20
will see
20:21
and you also see more
20:24
internationalization
20:25
of the remnb but today i'm an investor
20:28
um in chinese capital markets um for the
20:32
last couple of years it's been
20:34
and i can safely bring my money
20:38
in and out and i have to in making those
20:41
decisions
20:42
decide what the relative risks are
20:45
of one type of risk versus another type
20:48
of risk
20:48
any country including the united states
20:52
can establish capital controls um
20:55
and there's a risk that countries china
20:58
does have capital control
21:00
one is theoretical one is actual but the
21:02
degree of capital controls
21:04
um as an investor who brings
21:06
international money
21:07
in and out of there some onshore
21:10
some uh linked because of the links that
21:14
they've created in hong kong for hong
21:16
kong markets and so on
21:17
i can get in various ways those types of
21:20
exposures both onshore
21:22
and offshore in a way that allows me to
21:25
put my money in
21:26
and take my money out i can do that um
21:30
so it's not an impediment as a
21:32
professional investor is doing this i
21:33
can guarantee you
21:34
it's not an impediment and so in making
21:37
those choices
21:37
now i recognize that at any time that
21:40
that could be
21:41
closed and you might have issues and so
21:44
on just like i
21:45
recognize you know it's it's a risk here
21:47
but one has to weigh those risks because
21:50
in re weighing those risk to be absent
21:54
the chinese capital markets is very
21:57
risky
21:58
uh because if you're looking at this
22:01
almost as being
22:02
think of it just as diversification um
22:05
there's the united states
22:06
and there's china and basically those
22:09
are the two big economies if you're
22:10
dealing with
22:11
mo industries of the future technology
22:14
and so on
22:15
um to be heavily weighted entirely
22:19
weighted almost
22:20
in the countries that are the older you
22:24
know
22:24
the reserve currency countries the
22:26
united states jur
22:27
um uh europe and japan and you look at
22:31
those
22:31
older more indebted countries that are
22:33
having problems
22:34
with monetary policy because they have
22:36
to produce a lot of debt and produce a
22:38
lot of money to do that
22:39
and then you and to not be in china is
22:42
to me in my opinion risky so i feel that
22:46
i have to have a diversification and i
22:48
compare those risks so none of the risks
22:51
are
22:52
zero it's just a matter of of assessing
22:55
that
22:55
and i can tell you yeah that market
22:58
that foreign investors are moving in and
23:01
the chinese are doing things to build
23:03
confidence
23:04
they can undermine it but i think that
23:06
the diversification
23:08
benefits are outweigh uh the risks
23:12
did the delay of the ant uh ipo
23:16
affect um that whole concept
23:20
no and um it's it's
23:23
it's such a good example that westerners
23:26
i think are like on their edges of the
23:28
seats
23:30
and they pay so much attention to the
23:32
one development
23:33
you know we're almost like news hungry
23:35
people what's today's
23:36
development and they don't pay attention
23:38
to the evolution
23:40
um i've uh had a lot of dealings with
23:43
uh chinese financial regulators and i
23:46
could say that
23:47
uh generally speaking no not generally
23:50
speaking almost always speaking
23:51
i found them to be reasonable caring
23:55
and highly informed people who are now
23:58
in an environment which is
24:00
um changing at an extremely fast pace
24:04
and that there's a risk of uh being
24:07
uh too loose or too tight particularly
24:10
on new types of
24:12
uh investment the ant is a whole new
24:15
concept innovative concept in terms of
24:18
banking
24:19
and almost could replace or threaten
24:22
or the banking system in china and it
24:24
hasn't
24:25
yet been properly established in terms
24:27
of regulatory
24:28
review and the like and so
24:31
that's an element and of course it's
24:34
important
24:35
to be clear that um what we have in
24:38
china
24:38
is state capitalism so state is going to
24:42
control those things
24:43
but i've watched in the united states in
24:46
terms of regulatory authorities struggle
24:48
to try to get the balance
24:49
between freedom of what is being done
24:52
and restrictions on what is being done
24:54
right
24:55
we had the financial crisis in the
24:57
united states
24:58
because they were too liberal in terms
25:00
of controlling some of the things that
25:01
were being done
25:02
there's always a wrestling match on that
25:04
and then
25:05
i think ant got ahead of that um it's up
25:08
to one
25:09
to interpret that but anyway it's the
25:10
regulatory authorities to decide that
25:13
and then so i think it was progressing
25:15
too fast and it had to be clear
25:17
as to who the authority was at one point
25:20
in my life i was an investment banker
25:22
who did ipos
25:23
if three days before an ipo
25:27
the deal was pulled wow that probably
25:29
would have been the end of my career at
25:31
that point that's quite a
25:33
you were not in good contact with the
25:35
regulators if that happened
25:36
um china is not
25:40
the same we can't um
25:45
judge china by the same exact standards
25:49
in the same ways
25:51
and i think that people could make the
25:54
mistake
25:56
of um mistaking
25:59
imperfections for
26:02
the changes in the directions
26:07
so as i'm saying if you look at the
26:10
directions
26:11
and you look at what's going on those
26:13
are the trends
26:14
and those are the forces about the big
26:16
things that i think that are going
26:18
going on i mean one could make a strong
26:21
argument that
26:22
that if you compare the language of the
26:24
third plenum of the 18th party congress
26:27
which was in 2013 to the
26:30
two weeks ago the fifth plenum of the
26:32
19th party congress
26:34
with respect to state participation in
26:37
the economy
26:38
it's really quite starkly different um
26:40
and a lot of the chinese miracle that
26:42
you have witnessed
26:43
in your 36 years and i've witnessed in
26:46
my
26:47
41 years in china is based upon the
26:50
private sector
26:52
and is the miracle going to continue
26:55
if the state is playing such a major
26:58
role
27:01
i think it's um it's important to
27:03
understand
27:04
to know the people and to understand the
27:06
intentions and then
27:08
interpret the actions in light of those
27:10
particular
27:11
intentions i think a lot of foreigners
27:16
may misunderstand that the very strong
27:20
reform policies that we've seen
27:23
pervasively at an extremely
27:25
fast pace are also happening at a time
27:29
when there's not going to be um total
27:32
or on um
27:36
unleashed state-owned enterprises
27:37
because there's certain benefits
27:39
so i see they're wrestling with
27:42
the question of what is what should be a
27:45
state-owned enterprise
27:47
and what shouldn't be a state-owned
27:48
enterprise is that a strategic
27:51
um enterprise should that be a problem
27:54
public private partnership should it
27:56
bring in equity
27:58
um or and so the desire to
28:01
um corporatize or privatize or whatever
28:06
a lot of state-owned enterprises and at
28:08
the same time
28:09
to keep them also many of them control
28:12
let's remember that this is a socialist
28:16
um capitalist economy and that when
28:20
matters of
28:20
employment are entered into their um
28:24
and direction everything is not a free
28:27
market
28:27
society um in the united states it's
28:31
almost entirely uh entirely a free
28:33
market
28:34
that has good and bad things sometimes
28:36
it's difficult to get resources
28:37
to where the resources should go
28:39
sometimes in education whatever
28:41
in building infrastructure building
28:43
roads is a challenge
28:44
in the united states there are pros and
28:46
cons but
28:47
in this um state capitalist type of
28:50
system
28:51
there will be those types of controls
28:54
and directions
28:55
i don't i think it would be a mistake to
28:58
say
28:58
um that um the
29:01
uh privatization let's call it of
29:04
state-owned enterprises
29:06
in china is not um happening
29:09
the way we capitalists would like
29:12
to mistake that to being that china
29:15
is not being is not producing uh
29:19
capitalist type of things like the
29:21
development of capital markets
29:23
um the increase in efficiencies i mean
29:26
we could just look at the results
29:28
you know we can look at how the covid
29:30
was handled how their economy is handled
29:32
and so thought if we're so hung up on
29:35
getting it exactly that way they
29:37
we might miss the bigger things that are
29:39
going on
29:41
you know i would argue that the returns
29:42
on state-owned capital versus private
29:45
capital are much much lower and
29:46
ultimately
29:48
they they will have to pay a price for
29:49
it but that's but that's
29:51
that's up to investors have the beauty
29:54
of being able to decide whether they
29:56
want to go into
29:58
or not want to go into those enterprises
30:01
but they're you you must agree that
30:04
there's a plethora
30:06
of uh wonderful companies
30:09
that this year will probably have
30:11
something like 40 percent of the ipos be
30:14
china
30:14
in the world big ipos um be chinese
30:18
companies
30:18
on chinese markets anyway a lot of them
30:21
will be chinese companies on chinese
30:23
markets
30:24
and we as investors have to decide
30:27
whether we want to go
30:28
to those companies in those markets or
30:30
not and so there's a lot
30:32
there to offer while you might stay
30:34
choose to stay
30:35
clear of the uh say don't enterprises if
30:37
you like
30:38
okay well let's go to our first um
30:40
audience question
30:41
from jasmine fan at blackrock
30:46
hello my name is jasmine fan from new
30:48
york and my
30:49
question is how do you think american
30:52
investment companies
30:53
should position themselves in the world
30:56
of u.s china decoupling
30:58
but also to consider opportunities in
31:00
the gradual opening
31:02
of china's financial market thank you
31:06
thank you for your question i think the
31:09
world is changing in very profound ways
31:12
and i think that um
31:16
sometimes when we look at it up close we
31:18
can mix the big pictures of change
31:22
and um that it is changing where
31:25
china is um really gaining its stride
31:30
um and anyway it will be a competitive
31:33
power so i think that investors
31:35
and um investment managers have a
31:38
responsibility
31:40
to um know china well be there
31:43
um and make investments there as they
31:46
must
31:46
i'm a global macro investor so i have to
31:49
be in all the major
31:50
markets and assess those and i think
31:52
that diversification
31:54
and being there and being aware so that
31:57
you have
31:58
um an intimacy of understanding of
32:01
what's going on in china
32:03
and make that those choices from that
32:06
intimate
32:06
up close perspective i think is required
32:10
if you're roughly at three percent now
32:12
and you're saying a neutral weighting
32:14
would be 15
32:15
how long do you think it'll take for
32:18
international investors to move to that
32:21
weighting
32:22
how many years by the way that 15
32:25
is also growing at a fast pace
32:28
so um i expect the 15
32:31
will grow and i expect that the
32:34
uh 15 percent so the 15 will grow in the
32:37
share of that will grow
32:39
um i would expect um i can't tell you
32:43
uh you know how fast but i would i would
32:47
say
32:48
maybe um you know something in the
32:51
vicinity
32:52
of a 30 to 50 percent uh
32:55
growth rate and not probably more annual
32:59
yeah yeah what is
33:03
central bank digital currency going to
33:04
play a role in this now that it's begun
33:07
to be
33:07
rolled out in in china
33:10
the um let me um explain digital
33:14
currencies for a second
33:16
um um globally there are two purposes
33:19
of an exchange rate and of a currency
33:23
and that is is a medium of exchange in a
33:25
store hold of wealth
33:27
um there so there's the digitalizing
33:30
of the clearing system um at
33:34
no central bank i believe is going to
33:37
allow
33:38
an alternative currency to gain strength
33:40
such as
33:41
a bitcoin type of currency and so on the
33:44
power of having
33:45
your own currency and being able to
33:47
print your own money is an enormous
33:49
power
33:50
and i don't think that you will see
33:51
anything like that but the
33:52
digitalization
33:53
is not only efficient from a transaction
33:57
point of view
33:58
it helps to um minimize
34:01
the risks of um the existing clearing
34:05
system
34:06
which is fairly heavily influenced by
34:08
the united states
34:10
some of our uh sanctions a lot of our
34:12
sanctions as you might understand
34:14
um which probably sanctions are our
34:18
greatest power the united states
34:19
greatest power
34:20
happen by um influencing through
34:24
sanctions
34:24
uh currency movements uh through the
34:27
swift clearing system and the like
34:29
uh digitalization um
34:32
helps to reduce those risks so that's
34:35
what's going on with
34:36
uh digitalization and i expect that
34:40
it will be um it'll be successful
34:43
even though ali and tencent already had
34:46
what was in effect digital
34:48
payment systems again is this was this a
34:50
question of the state
34:51
participating where the private sector
34:53
was already in it
34:55
this this is um the government
34:59
um uh the currency offering a
35:03
digitalized version of the currency
35:09
let's go to the next video question from
35:11
the next question from corey cooper
35:13
uh columbia law school black voices on
35:16
greater china
35:18
hello my name is corey cooper i'll be
35:21
attending the china town hall
35:23
keynote program with ray dalio online
35:26
my question has to do with the future of
35:29
u.s
35:30
china business relations general
35:32
secretary xi jinping recently gave
35:35
a foreign business friendly speech at
35:37
the third china international
35:39
import expo however given president
35:43
trump's propensity for blaming china
35:45
when questioned about the u.s economy
35:47
and the desire of some officials and his
35:50
administration to demonstrate their
35:52
quote
35:54
tough on china i wonder what your
35:56
thoughts are
35:57
on how likely it is that business
35:59
relations could actually deteriorate
36:01
rather than improve further between now
36:04
and january 20th when trump officially
36:07
leaves office
36:09
thank you
36:12
well um there's the question of the
36:14
conflicts and then there's the date
36:16
uh both are embedded in that question i
36:18
think um there are five types of
36:20
conflicts uh that exist with
36:23
the rising power challenging and
36:25
existing power um
36:27
they are and we call them wars there's a
36:30
trade war there's a technology war
36:32
there is a geopolitical war
36:36
um there is a capital war and then there
36:40
is a military let's call it competition
36:43
that you know could conceivably be into
36:45
a military war
36:46
uh they're all connected and they're um
36:49
and
36:50
because of the threats of those we um
36:53
are having uh decoupalization uh
36:57
taking place and and and which means the
36:59
building of
37:00
sort of self-sufficiency um and so that
37:04
is going to
37:05
be with us uh for a long time and how
37:07
those
37:08
conflicts are handled will uh matter a
37:11
lot
37:12
as far as the trump moves between now
37:14
and the
37:15
end of the year um regarding any actions
37:18
with china
37:19
i wouldn't expect my own guess is that
37:22
there wouldn't be
37:23
um any big developments uh that are
37:26
that that would be traumatic or
37:28
surprising
37:29
um in in either side but you know i'm
37:32
not
37:33
the geopolitical expert who should be
37:36
offering those uh comments as well as
37:39
other people here but by speaking to
37:42
many of those
37:43
i would say i wouldn't expect between
37:45
now
37:46
and january 20th a significant
37:50
uh developments in chinese uh
37:53
american relations pertaining to the
37:55
things you're asking about
37:57
yeah we have to hope not so there were
37:59
additional sanctions put on people in
38:01
hong kong
38:02
uh last night by secretary pompeo
38:06
um let's go you mentioned technology
38:09
let's go to a question on
38:10
technology from nick young in san
38:13
francisco
38:15
hi everyone this is nick young in san
38:17
francisco
38:19
as the u.s china tech war intensifies
38:22
both countries are pursuing separate
38:24
models of global cyber governance with
38:26
distinct values in ecosystems
38:29
china may have initiated this process
38:31
when it blocked facebook twitter and
38:32
google more than a decade ago
38:34
but now the united states has retaliated
38:37
by issuing
38:38
executive orders banning tick-tock and
38:40
wechat
38:41
with no positive turn in sight what
38:43
would a technology decoupling look like
38:45
and what would be the consequences
38:51
um the technology
38:55
decoupling um it's of course there's so
38:57
many technologies and so many um
39:01
applications but let's say at the big
39:02
picture level um
39:04
it certainly uh reduces the pace of
39:07
uh development um and
39:10
it um it puts um
39:14
entities uh who are trying to juggle
39:17
both
39:17
um you know sort of on edge um it
39:20
um um it means
39:24
my opinion it sets back development
39:27
particularly in the united
39:29
states in in some ways in china
39:32
um let's let's deal with that privacy
39:35
issue
39:36
um it is technologically a fact
39:40
that the more data you have um
39:43
and the the more uh artificial
39:46
intelligence is applied to that data
39:49
um the better you can understand and
39:53
uh manage things so uh from a
39:57
uh competitive point of view i think um
40:01
it's a desirable thing uh to have
40:04
the kind of uh massive collection of
40:08
data i've heard just just different
40:10
numbers eight times as much data per
40:12
person and so on and of course the other
40:14
side of that is the privacy side
40:16
um and well you know each person comes
40:19
down where they want what is the
40:21
uh benefit of of that privacy
40:24
in china um it's most people um
40:28
view that as something the that absence
40:31
of privacy is something that brings
40:32
about
40:33
uh the better security and a more civil
40:36
society
40:37
in the united states we value personal
40:40
uh privacy issues i'm not going to get
40:42
into that but from an efficiency point
40:45
of view
40:45
um it's you know contrary uh
40:49
to efficiency when those technologies
40:52
are decoupled
40:53
um and it also um
40:56
is somewhat of a disadvantage
40:58
technologically
41:00
um to have more uh holding of data
41:04
private than to um use it in a broader
41:07
way
41:10
raises the question of reciprocity
41:13
though
41:13
that facebook google youtube twitter
41:16
uh have been blocked in china for a
41:19
number of years now and
41:21
and wechat and tick tock and other
41:24
chinese
41:25
social media apps are able to operate in
41:28
the united states how do we resolve
41:30
that question in other words it's
41:33
there's a there's a sense and you've i
41:34
heard this a lot from the trump
41:36
administration
41:37
i'm i oppose the the wechat
41:40
and uh and tick-tock uh bans in the
41:43
united states however the response
41:45
from the trump administration is it's
41:47
not fair because we can't operate
41:49
similarly in china
41:51
um i think um i think everybody has to
41:54
look at what
41:56
the bigger picture what are the
41:59
most important things in each country
42:03
that won't be that'll be lines that
42:05
won't be able to be
42:06
compromised and there are different
42:08
things in different countries
42:11
um so you you're not going to get
42:16
equal approaches or
42:19
for example the privacy issue and google
42:22
and so on
42:23
um developing in china has to do with
42:27
how information is managed in china that
42:30
is managed in a way that's different
42:31
from
42:32
how it's managed in the united states
42:34
and so
42:35
reciprocity is not going to be something
42:39
that
42:39
you can develop policies on we're going
42:41
to have the same reciprocity you could
42:43
use them as
42:44
negotiating so you i think you have to
42:46
look at the you know what are the most
42:48
important things in you know china and
42:52
there's a certain government approach
42:54
that doesn't have
42:55
that same uh free flow of information
42:58
particularly foreigners however
42:59
we also there's a economic uh component
43:03
of it too
43:04
some countries are protectionists more
43:06
protectionists and more protectionists
43:08
in
43:08
some ways than other countries so those
43:11
are matters
43:12
of you know negotiation um but they
43:15
can't be
43:16
approached like um you know that
43:19
we can demand reciprocity with matters
43:21
that are not equal for example uh the
43:24
big issue
43:24
for the china for the biden
43:26
administration
43:28
is the human rights issue um
43:31
okay um that issue um is going to be
43:35
then dealt with with a sovereignty
43:37
question in china
43:38
china would view um a human rights
43:41
question
43:42
as a sovereignty question uh should
43:45
countries
43:46
uh operating um outside there outside
43:50
some of this jurisdiction
43:51
assess and judge and exert
43:54
pressure on how they should deal with
43:56
with domestic affairs
43:58
and so on so you have so how will that
44:01
work out
44:02
um there'll probably be a whole lot of
44:04
arguing about that
44:05
and then it'll come down to you know who
44:08
has what power
44:09
at the end of the day this whole thing's
44:11
going to come down to who has what power
44:14
and that's why i think we almost in the
44:16
united states
44:17
the important most important thing is
44:19
focusing on
44:21
how we can get stronger but anyway those
44:24
issues won't be resolved by um
44:27
expecting though we we do it and then
44:30
they'll do it too
44:31
see but the problem we have because
44:33
we're dealing you know
44:34
obviously i'm dealing with the congress
44:36
dealing hopefully with the new biden
44:38
administration
44:39
is when they're violations of what are
44:42
universal values this isn't a question
44:44
you know that it becomes extremely
44:46
difficult to persuade
44:48
the congress the american people that we
44:50
should even be
44:51
dealing with them on a lot of these
44:54
issues
44:55
so when you talk about reciprocity
44:57
people just go well
44:59
it's just not fair it's just not fair we
45:02
shouldn't be allowing that and the
45:04
argument the chinese make
45:06
with respect to facebook google youtube
45:09
twitter
45:09
actually doesn't hold water it it's
45:12
exactly what you said in the second
45:14
part it's protectionist it's economic
45:17
protectionism
45:18
it's not truly national security and if
45:20
china is not willing
45:22
to enter into discussions on these kinds
45:25
of issues
45:26
it's going to be really tough to get to
45:28
a constructive relationship
45:30
well um i think
45:35
the problem is that um different people
45:38
uh have different views about what is
45:41
fair
45:43
and in the reality of world affairs
45:46
is that those interpretations don't
45:49
matter
45:50
really much in international relations
45:53
maybe unfortunately but
45:55
maybe fortunately because if different
45:57
people have different views of what's
45:58
fair maybe you can't get
46:00
there and the only thing that really
46:02
matters are relative strengths
46:04
relative powers uh because it's a
46:06
negotiating
46:07
um thing and so um
46:12
you know it's very interesting um in the
46:14
history
46:16
uh the united states um really starting
46:19
under wilson
46:20
woodrow wilson was the first country
46:24
in history to view
46:27
that the relationships between countries
46:30
should be analogous to the relationships
46:34
that we want to have between people
46:36
within countries
46:37
in other words he viewed that the united
46:39
states as a democracy and that
46:42
um the way people should be with each
46:45
other
46:46
should be a model for world governance
46:48
and that's why
46:49
he formed uh the league of nations and
46:52
the league of nations failed and the
46:54
united nations failed and
46:56
after it so there's not a world
47:00
organization there's not a world court
47:02
to adjudicate
47:04
differences so for example when if you
47:07
say
47:07
that um you know the world uh wants um
47:11
um let's say that human rights issue and
47:14
so on
47:15
i would suppose if the world uh signed
47:17
an agreement
47:18
and agreed by and had enforceability
47:22
so that um they were that then you could
47:25
bring them to the
47:26
to the world court and resolve that um
47:29
and
47:29
uh let's say on the issue of wto uh
47:33
china brought issues of wto uh to the
47:36
wto
47:36
and um certain things were decided in
47:39
its favor certain things are decided
47:41
against it but the wto is
47:43
in not a governing institution and it
47:46
doesn't work
47:47
and neither does the united nations and
47:51
because power is where it comes down to
47:54
so americans have gotten used to
47:57
comfortably used to having their way and
48:00
deciding
48:01
that okay that's fair that's not fair
48:03
and so on be
48:04
as an extension of the power that we had
48:07
as a result of you know 1945 we created
48:10
a new world order
48:11
the united american world order and we
48:14
had power economic
48:15
and military power and so we really got
48:18
to judge others
48:19
and determine what was fair i think that
48:22
um
48:23
you know we're not going to be able to
48:24
resolve that and if we keep
48:26
looking at it that way we may not get
48:29
what we want
48:30
i think we have to look at it
48:32
realistically i think the byte
48:34
administration is going to look at
48:35
building coalitions
48:37
and to the extent that a country is
48:39
perceived as a violator of international
48:41
law
48:42
it will be much easier to build the
48:44
coalition
48:45
against the behavior that was a
48:47
violation of international law if you
48:49
look at
48:50
the ruling under the convention of the
48:53
law of the sea
48:54
which was against china in favor of the
48:57
philippines
48:58
it put a lot of pressure on china to
49:01
modify its behavior
49:02
because it does not want to be perceived
49:05
as a violator of international law
49:08
by other countries especially by the
49:10
asean countries
49:12
who were involved so let's go to some of
49:13
the the cooperative um
49:16
aspects of the relationship but a
49:18
question on
49:19
climate and health from benji written
49:23
hi there my name is benji renton and
49:25
i'll be attending china town hall in
49:27
middlebury vermont this year
49:29
and my question is what do you see is
49:31
the most important area
49:32
for the us and china to collaborate on
49:34
science and research
49:36
and how can these two superpowers learn
49:38
from coven 19
49:39
and work together to prevent the next
49:42
pandemic
49:44
well i i think uh that's a great
49:47
question
49:48
and there's tremendous opportunity
49:51
for cooperation and you know it it
49:54
almost goes back to
49:55
ping-pong diplomacy but the idea
49:59
of dealing with climate change
50:02
that's a common interest um uh
50:06
not only this pandemic but uh
50:09
global health issues um
50:12
just the re-establishing
50:16
communications and looking for areas of
50:19
cooperation
50:20
i think would go a long way to
50:24
improving um the psychology and and
50:27
demonstrating
50:29
the win-win potential of those
50:32
relationships
50:35
let's go on to uh society and culture
50:38
um you know the committee's been doing a
50:40
lot of programming
50:42
on kind of anti-asian bias in the united
50:45
states and you've written extensively
50:47
about a persistent anti-china bias
50:51
um many of these subtle prejudices have
50:54
come out in the open in the past year
50:57
um how pernicious do you think this
51:00
threat is
51:01
and how do you become more empathetic
51:04
with our cultural differences and yet
51:07
hold firm to our values
51:09
um again i'm like a mechanic not an i
51:12
don't have an ideology pertaining to
51:15
this is just a mechanic
51:16
um anger
51:20
traditionally comes uh racism
51:24
um demonization uh
51:27
across classes um comes
51:30
during periods of uh economic
51:34
distress and um
51:37
so we see it here in the united states
51:39
um a
51:40
number of statistics that could show is
51:43
um
51:44
that the majority of republicans and the
51:47
majority of democrats
51:49
actually hate the other side
51:52
um and and so um whether that's
51:57
uh rich poor racial
52:00
um geographic all of those uh prejudices
52:05
sort of come out particularly then if
52:07
you have an opponent
52:08
the idea of demonizing the other side
52:13
in pursuit of good versus evil
52:16
is the way that normally happens um
52:19
so um we're seeing that happen
52:22
now uh what does that mean i mean i
52:25
don't think it's a good thing
52:26
i think it's you know understanding
52:30
um having contact with each other it
52:32
does a world of good
52:34
in all of those cases for um you know
52:37
the communications
52:39
understanding it helps people understand
52:42
each other
52:43
uh so i'm you know but i don't think
52:47
uh what can be done i um
52:50
i think whatever propaganda
52:54
um or views are largely going to be
52:58
extended by the leadership and the media
53:02
um so um it's quite often the case
53:06
that when a country has problems um
53:09
they try to bring it together by finding
53:12
a you know an enemy on the
53:13
outside it would go a long way
53:16
um if um president biden
53:20
uh said something nice about china
53:23
and the chinese or or the potential of
53:26
working together and it would be very
53:27
nice
53:28
if uh president xi reciprocated and they
53:31
took some actions along those lines
53:33
and then there would be you know
53:36
hopefully
53:37
a a change in the meme in terms of those
53:40
kinds of things
53:42
uh but it's a symptom of our times i
53:44
think yeah
53:45
i i fully expect the body administration
53:48
to take action
53:49
uh against anti-asian bias that they
53:52
will
53:52
make statements they'll revise visa
53:54
policies
53:56
that relate to really ethnicity they'll
53:59
end the muslim ban
54:00
they'll reform they'll revise uh
54:03
visa policy towards chinese students
54:05
they'll revise h1b
54:08
uh policies i expect that they will do
54:10
that because they've really
54:12
i think the asian-american community
54:13
came out strongly for
54:15
uh for president-elect biden at the same
54:18
time
54:19
i'm you know i expect that'll be the
54:21
case and i hope so
54:22
at the same time these deep-seated
54:25
prejudices about even the scenarios that
54:30
are underway
54:31
are um there's a percentage of a
54:34
population a large percentage
54:36
um that nurtures those yeah
54:39
and i think we need to you know
54:42
transparency and light is a great
54:44
disinfectant
54:45
um and we need to make sure that you
54:48
know
54:48
that does not shape uh the formulation
54:51
of american policy
54:53
i believe the challenge though on that
54:55
um is also the media
54:57
um the media when put together with
55:00
politics
55:01
um you know it's it's nice for us to say
55:04
but it's difficult to uh get that kind
55:08
of
55:08
light shown on um
55:11
yeah yeah i mean i i think the media is
55:14
actually
55:15
pretty good in this respect you know
55:17
we've seen the media
55:19
you know a chinese-american
55:21
correspondent working for cbs
55:23
called out in a white house press
55:25
conference in what to me
55:27
was one of the more shocking events over
55:29
the last four years
55:30
um let's go to a question from blake
55:33
moss
55:34
in kentucky my name is blake moss and
55:38
i'm from lawrenceburg kentucky
55:39
my question is why should people from
55:42
small towns in kentucky and other places
55:44
across the south
55:45
even care about u.s china relations how
55:48
does it affect
55:48
them in their daily lives thank you for
55:51
taking my question
55:54
good question um well
55:58
uh it's affects you certainly
56:00
economically
56:02
um a lot of the uh
56:05
goods that you've uh that you buy
56:09
um at relatively low prices
56:13
uh have been produced in china and so
56:16
that affects you in that way
56:17
economically and of course their
56:19
competition
56:21
has affected jobs certain types of jobs
56:25
that have moved to china and that have
56:28
left the united states
56:29
and so that has an effect on you and
56:32
then of course
56:33
um uh what happens to our money
56:37
uh the value of our money um its
56:40
purchasing power
56:41
uh is affected by what happens in the
56:43
united states
56:44
and what happens in china and then of
56:47
course
56:47
um then there are there's this great uh
56:51
geopolitical struggle which might or
56:53
might not affect you
56:55
depending on you know how what what
56:57
transpires
56:59
um you know hopefully uh that won't
57:02
affect you and so you'll
57:03
hear about all the struggles in the
57:05
south china seas and so on and maybe
57:07
that won't matter but the technologies
57:09
you use
57:11
the cost of the goods that you um
57:14
have to buy um the jobs and so on
57:18
are affected by a lot by chinese
57:21
american relations
57:25
is it fair to conclude ray that that you
57:27
think the greatest enemy
57:29
of america is itself and the greatest
57:31
enemy of china
57:32
is itself yeah and if so kind of give us
57:36
a sense of
57:37
why and what that means for policies
57:40
well because um it's an all of this is a
57:44
natural extension of
57:46
strength and well-being and so those
57:48
eight measures that i mentioned before
57:51
are the fundamental underpinnings of
57:53
strength
57:54
you know the quality and extensiveness
57:57
of education
58:00
this is the civility of the people
58:03
um then the development of resource
58:07
allocation systems such as our capital
58:10
markets
58:11
allocation system um our ability to
58:15
produce things at competitive way
58:17
rates our ability to then
58:20
earn more than we spend these kinds
58:23
and the development of a military that
58:26
keeps you strong
58:27
and protects you all of those things
58:29
those fundamental strengths
58:32
through all history through all time
58:35
have been most important in determining
58:37
the well-being
58:38
of um of countries and so
58:42
we rise and decline based on those
58:46
so for example if we threaten the world
58:48
the reserve currency
58:50
status let's say nowadays we're gonna
58:52
have to produce a lot of debt
58:55
i go through the calculations who will
58:57
buy that debt
58:58
americans don't have enough capacity to
59:00
buy that debt
59:01
all that debt they have to sell it to
59:04
others outside the world
59:05
at the outside world those others
59:08
already own too much of it
59:09
and they're a little bit worried about
59:11
what the return on that's going to be
59:14
um americans even on bonds but pension
59:18
funds endowments
59:19
don't think that bonds are going to give
59:21
them the returns that they need in order
59:23
to be successful
59:25
if you don't buy the bonds and so on
59:27
then you're going to
59:29
have to um not buy more than you can
59:32
afford to buy and all of that
59:34
so these basic fundamental underpinnings
59:38
are what makes uh a place strong
59:41
competitive
59:42
in the world makes it currency strong
59:44
and competitive in the world to
59:46
encounter
59:47
others in the world that's just basic
59:50
we're out of time so let me just close
59:52
with the question with chinese media and